Working Group 8: The ‘Dreadnought’ Working Group
Chair: Dr Bryan Wells (UK), NATO Chief Scientist
Chair/Rapporteur: Anna Wieslander (Sweden) Director, Northern Europe, Atlantic Council (TAG)
The Dreadnought Working Group considered the impact of combinations of emerging and disruptive technologies on military strategy. According to NATO Science and Technology Trends 2023-2043 the most likely impactful combinations include: Data-AI-Autonomy, Data-AI-Biotechnology and Human Enhancement, Data-AI-Materials, Data-Quantum Technologies, Energy-Materials-AI, Space-Hypersonics-Materials, and Space-Quantum. What kinds of impact on defence and military strategy and policy will these combinations of EDT have? What combinations of EDTs are potential adversaries focusing on and how best should NATO and nations respond to defend against them? What kinds of capability development strategies and approaches are needed for NATO and nations to leverage and protect the potential of these combinations of EDT to retain NATO’s military advantage?
James Holland (UK), Writer, Broadcaster and World War Two Historian
Lawrence Freedman (UK), Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London
Paul Beaver (UK), Director, National Spitfire Project
Rob Bertholee (Netherlands), former Commander, Royal Netherlands Army (TAG)
Rob de Wijk (Netherlands), Founder, Hague Centre for Security Strategy (TAG)
Yves Boyer (France), Emeritus Professor, Ecole Polytechnique
THE REPORT
The core task for the Dreadnought Working Group was to consider the impact of combinations of emerging and disruptive technologies on military strategy, using the Dreadnought as a point of departure. The group discussions therefore initially circled around the basic questions; What was the Dreadnought? How is it relevant today as a metaphor and as a historical example?
In short, the HMS Dreadnought was a Royal Navy Battleship, which entered into service in 1906. The design of the ship revolutionized navy power, and because of its capabilities were so advanced, it led to a whole generation of battleships being associated with it. It was equivalent of two or even three ships before her. This of course took enormous efforts and vast expenses over many years. The Dreadnought had supremacy in speed, range, agility, the size of the guns and its destructive power – all of this resulted in military dominance. It was built in secrecy, which was unusual at the time, and the Germans were in shock and panic when it was launched.
The Working Group used the term Dreadnought as a metaphor for a strategic military shock.
The Working Group then chose to work with two scenarios which were two sides of the Dreadnought coin: either (i) NATO and Allies face a Dreadnought threat from Russia and/or China, or (ii) NATO and Allies could benefit from a Dreadnought Moment of their own by successfully developing such a capability. A Dreadnought moment could be a new weapon system, which the group mostly discussed, but the group also acknowledged that the Dreadnought could be thought of in a wider sense, for example the US leaving NATO, or finding the synthetic substitute to a rare earth mineral crucial for new technology.
Two sides of the Dreadnought coin:
A. Dreadnought upon us – (Pearl Harbor moment)
How do we deter? Or rather, is it possible to deter?
There are many elements for successful deterrence in a Dreadnought context.
Deterrence can be undertaken partly through large exercises, thereby showing resolve and strength. NATO could do more pop-up presence and snap exercises, hence playing on ambiguity to strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture.
Intelligence assessment is a key element. Allies have to make sure that they do not have gaps in intelligence, and there should be a sufficient level of intelligence sharing among allies. NATO can also work actively with joint threat assessments. There is a risk that NATO and Allies assess the intelligence incorrectly, particularly if the conclusion is uncomfortable. For instance a large-scale Russian-Chinese exercise and troop mobilization somewhere along the Eastern flank might be incorrectly assessed. NATO and Allies might not therefore be able to see the Dreadnought moment coming. Equally, NATO and Allies would have to prevent the adversary from using the Dreadnought: deterrence-by-denial is the best. Understanding and navigating the political context is necessary to successfully calibrate the appropriate response.
The group discussed the example of Pearl Harbor, which was an intelligence failure, and concluded that NATO and Allies would need to demonstrate that they have long term resilience, including the basic infrastructure, ammunition, manpower and people who understand why they are fighting; it is in the nature of the psychology of a shock that civil society will adjust.
Mobilisation is an important instrument, but there would be particularly difficult political decisions on the point in a crisis escalation at which mobilization was activated. In addition, readiness of troops is insufficient in many allied countries and a major weakness in NATO’s New Force Model. The total defence concept is useful, but in some countries like the UK there is no total defence framework, which makes it more difficult and increases the risk that the an ally is taken by surprise.
Allies need to engage in strategic communication, such as conversations with the public on the threats from Russia, China and other adversaries. There is a need to counter disinformation and propaganda and explain why Allies must invest more in defence and preparedness.
At the moment, NATO and allies rely heavily on nuclear deterrence which is insufficiently constructed. NATO would put the nuclear weapons on alert to deter when a Dreadnought moment approached or occurred, but NATO lacks missile launch systems for nuclear weapons in Europe. It is a vulnerability that Europe is dependent on aircraft in such a situation as the F35’s do not reach far enough.
How do we deter?
There are many elements for successful deterrence in a Dreadnought context.
Deterrence can be undertaken partly through large exercises, thereby showing resolve and strength. NATO could do more pop-up presence and snap exercises, hence playing on ambiguity to strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture.
Intelligence assessment is a key element. Allies have to make sure that they do not have gaps in intelligence, and there should be a sufficient level of intelligence sharing among allies. NATO can also work actively with joint threat assessments. There is a risk that NATO and Allies assess the intelligence incorrectly, particularly if the conclusion is uncomfortable. For instance a large-scale Russian-Chinese exercise and troop mobilization somewhere along the Eastern flank might be incorrectly assessed. NATO and Allies might not therefore be able to see the Dreadnought moment coming. Equally, NATO and Allies would have to prevent the adversary from using the Dreadnought: deterrence-by-denial is the best. Understanding and navigating the political context is necessary to successfully calibrate the appropriate response.
The group discussed the example of Pearl Harbor, which was an intelligence failure, and concluded that NATO and Allies would need to demonstrate that they have long term resilience, including the basic infrastructure, ammunition, manpower and people who understand why they are fighting; it is in the nature of the psychology of a shock that civil society will adjust.
Mobilisation is an important instrument, but there would be particularly difficult political decisions on the point in a crisis escalation at which mobilization was activated. In addition, readiness of troops is insufficient in many allied countries and a major weakness in NATO’s New Force Model. The total defence concept is useful, but in some countries like the UK there is no total defence framework, which makes it more difficult and increases the risk that the an ally is taken by surprise.
Allies need to engage in strategic communication, such as conversations with the public on the threats from Russia, China and other adversaries. There is a need to counter disinformation and propaganda and explain why Allies must invest more in defence and preparedness.
At the moment, NATO and allies rely heavily on nuclear deterrence which is insufficiently constructed. NATO would put the nuclear weapons on alert to deter when a Dreadnought moment approached or occurred, but NATO lacks missile launch systems for nuclear weapons in Europe. It is a vulnerability that Europe is dependent on aircraft in such a situation as the F35’s do not reach far enough.
How do we defend?
Selected proportionality would be the guiding principle. The West would wish to avoid escalation in the case of a Dreadnought moment being brought upon us. We should not assume that we would respond symmetrically.
The industrial base is central. Allies have industry, a strategy, and funding but there needs to be political will to scale up and enter wartime production rates. The European Defence Industrial Base will have an important role.
The technological challenge will be how to mature technology into a capability as rapidly as possible will be t. Ukraine has been quick at improvising, driven by existential threat perception, which is an inspiration to us all.
B. Our Dreadnought moment
What would we want to achieve?
There are four elements that impact on what we would want to achieve with a strategic military capability shock: capability demonstration; political will to sustain the capability; technical considerations on developing the capability; and Allies working together.
Capability Demonstration
We would need to demonstrate that we have the technological capability of a Dreadnought (this need not be expensive)
We would wish to create a new layer of deterrence in order to defend every inch of NATO territory and provide a broadened, pro-longed escalation ladder which would provide politicians with more options along the road of handling war or crisis, in between traditional conventional and nuclear options (in order to prevent using them).
How do we gain political will?
Dreadnought is not only about technology: human factors are important and above all the political context must be considered. There needs to be a sense of urgency, of threat, and NATO Allies are split when it comes to existential threat perception. The big powers do not sense it. For a Dreadnought moment to occur for NATO and Allies, urgency must be combined with boldness. Put differently, leadership is a prerequisite.
Once the Dreadnought is in place, it is possible to create NATO buy-in and transparency by creating a group like the NATO Planning Group which deals with nuclear weapons.
Technical considerations
How would we identify Dreadnought? The most likely combination would be Data-AI-Autonomy which could be an intelligent unmanned air platform consisting of a combination of 6th generation F35s accompanied by powerful drones. Such a platform could for instance deliver and protect nuclear bombs at a completely new level.
The technology comes from commercial actors which means that we need well-functioning channels from civil tech companies to the defence companies and R&D establishment. Industrial strength in turn requires:
- Manufacturing capacity. The European Defence Industrial Base is important.
- Finance. Defence expenditure, the 2 % being floor not the ceiling.
- Manpower. Tech expertise, logistic support.
How would allies work together?
To develop a Dreadnought moment, allies should team up in smaller numbers, for instance the Nordic States could collaborate together. Another example is AUKUS, with its second pillar focusing on cooperation on new technologies. The basis for collaboration would be shared interests and costs. NATO and Allies do not focus sufficiently on production.
Recommendations
If NATO has a Dreadnought (strategic shock) capability, NATO and allies should:
- Be clear what they want to achieve:
- Broaden the ladder of escalation before the nuclear threshold is reached. (Identified as a gap)
- Enhance ambiguity towards the adversary, through complexity of responses available.
- Make our decision making simpler but the adversary’s more complex.
- Enhance resilience.
- Establish the necessary political will to act and invest: “Wake up, get ready, take action!”
- Note that different Allies have different threat perceptions. They also have different strategic cultures. Both need to be bridged.
- Allies need to undertake significant strategic communication to their own public and potential adversaries about the threat and need for resolve and investments to address it.
- Nations need to act as an Alliance to provide credibility and legitimacy.
- Nations need to address elements other than technology.
- Manufacturing capacity. The European Defence Industrial Base is important.
- People: Tech expertise, military, logistic support.
- Materials, including critical raw materials, rare earth minerals. Stockpiling necessary.
- Concept of Operations (CONOPs): how we would actually use the Dreadnought in our operations.
- NATO and allies should reinforce the use of AI in scenario exercises using best practices from elsewhere.
Recommendations: Deterrence and Defence against a strategic shock
Nato and allies should:
- Recognize that strategic shock often arises from incorrect intelligence assessment and therefore improve intelligence sharing and assessment among individual allies (not NATO collectively) – this is possible when there is a shared interest. There should be greater red teaming of assessments by using AI/computing.
- Enhance resilience using Total Defence concepts, fulfilling NATO’s baseline requirements on resilience and ensuring alignment with the NDPP. The risk of unrest/uprisings as reactions to potential use of nuclear weapons should be addressed by engaging civil society.
- Start considering asymmetric responses – creating unexpected combinations of responses with difficulty of attribution, massive cyber attacks, attacks on satellite systems, hitting for instance internet, banking, food and water supplies, and create our own Dreadnought moment.
- ensure flexible response options. For the military, long range delivery systems, conventional and or nuclear, are needed. Nuclear weapons are our strongest response and that instrument needs to work better in order to be credible.
Final group reflections
An interesting conclusion is that new technology is just one element that is necessary for military strategy. Rather, technology needs to be seen as part of a broader civil/military system if it is to be decisive. As with nuclear weapons, EDT combinations could indeed help deliver strategic military shock, but they need to be incorporated into a wider system in order to be effective.