Areas for further discussion and progress

The dialogue raised a number of tensions and questions that require further examination, research and resolution.

1. How can we build greater incentives for leaders to stick to constitutional term limits? It is importantto think more about exit paths and incentives for leaders. Other than the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, there are not many incentives for leaders to step down and ensure a democratic legacy. 
2. How to respond to popular uprisings? There has been a challenge since the Arab Spring of 2010. The AU, RECs and others find it hard to distinguish between narrow coups and efforts to remove leaders that have a genuinely popular backing. It is important to find a way to distinguish between these and potentially consider differentiated responses. It is worth recognising that some states have a legacy of military leaders seen to have made a positive impact (such as Sankara in Burkina Faso). 
3. How are Western actors positioned to respond to coups in the immediate aftermath? Western actors could think more about the first 48 hours after a coup, whether their own systems are well prepared to react. 
4. How to build more consistent responses to crises? International actors tend to respond to crises but are not always consistent. Ministers in Western countries have relatively short terms and their own national priorities. Trying to get consistency and not just responding in a knee-jerk way to crises is hard, but ideally international actors should work to improve coordination to reduce the burden on the countries they want to assist. The UN found 17 different international support plans for the Sahel, for example.
5. How to return to constitutional order? Pre-coup regimes were often corrupt, poorly managed and infringed on human rights. We should consider addressing these causes as well as thinking about how to react to military-led coup regimes.
6. How can electoral systems be enhanced? More needs to be done to strengthen electoral systems and associated institutions as flawed elections have been one of the biggest precursors to UCGs.  Genuinely independent election commission leaders have played an important role standing up to incumbents who wanted to manipulate processes (Zambia 2021, Liberia 2024).
7. How to strengthen accountable governance in non-democratic states? Some participants expressed the view that democracy may not yet be the right model in the Horn of Africa where post-colonial states are fighting for survival or viability. But in these states RECs and others could think about how to strengthen social contracts and empower people to hold elites accountable for delivering basic goods and food.
8. How to manage diversity? We may need to think again about ways of managing diversity, especially in large states such as DRC or Sudan, with groups spanning borders and where identity or nationality might feel more organic. One option proposed was to consider ongoing reconciliation efforts, with community outreach programs. Some people suggested that RECs or the AU could play a role in enabling the devolution of authority, but others wanted them to focus on encouraging greater regional integration.
9. How to improve the role and impact of anchor states? Anchor states can wield significant influence in their regions. There may be ways for them to show understanding of public or regional frustrations about international powers, but also stake out strong REC positions that can strengthen accountable governance and that clearly demonstrate that coups are not acceptable. 
10. How to respond to potential threats of violence?  Some election observation efforts focus on conflict prevention above all else. They consider an election successful if it is free from violence and delivers a peaceful transition, even if the process is significantly flawed.  Others felt that ignoring obvious short term democratic decline encouraged coups and UCGs in the longer term. Young people in particular were frustrated by the lack of international action in response to UCGs in Zimbabwe 2017 and Chad 2021. Some participants felt that incumbent politicians regularly warned about the potential for violence as a way of discouraging observers from saying anything critical. 
11. Are sanctions helping? There is a sense of international and regional double standards (AU on sanctions) that coup leaders have utilised (Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea) to turn their publics against regional sanctions.  Several participants were concerned about a perceived toning down of sanctions – some saw it as further signs of weakening AU and REC norms that could encourage future coups. Others welcomed the change, seeing it as an effort to alleviate the suffering of ordinary people and a way of enabling discussions with coup regimes. 
12. How do funding models impact RECs? Funding models may have an impact on the accountability of RECs and wider African institutions. ECOWAS has been stronger arguably because it is less reliant on international funding, so its members pay more attention to how it is run. 

List of acronyms

APRM – Africa Peer Review Mechanism

AU – African Union

EAC – East African Community

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development

PSC – Peace and Security Council

REC – Regional Economic Community

SADC – Southern African Development Community

UCG – Unconstitutional Change of Government

In partnership with the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and the US Department of State

Chris Day, Wilkie Briggs, Elizabeth Donnelly

July 2024