Background to the dialogue
The Lomé Declaration of 2000 outlined the (O)AU rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs). It continues to inform the policy of African regional institutions and initiatives to help build and protect the democratic systems most Africans want. This is complemented by ongoing, vibrant and determined efforts in many countries pressing for improved governance outcomes and accountable democracy.
Yet recent unconstitutional changes of government, declining scores for many dimensions of governance, and outbreaks of violent conflict highlight the fragility of gains made in development, good governance, peace and stability in Africa this century. A further challenge is presented by the current global context of contested international norms and relations.
This conference sought to acknowledge the diverse contexts in which UCGs have taken place while identifying common threads and examining collective approaches and responses. Discussions focussed on regional actors and how like-minded international partners should work with Africa’s regional institutions.
Introduction
Africa and the rest of the world are in flux. Autocracy has been on the rise and some see non-democratic development models as a credible alternative path to democracy.[1] The string of recent unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) in Africa poses significant challenges to African institutions, communities and wider international partners.
UCGs are arguably a manifestation of governance problems. If leaders reduce political space, hold flawed elections without the possibility of real change, and fail to address unemployment, inequality and security threats, it often leads to frustration and erodes public trust in democracy. This, together with perceptions of rising corruption has offered military leaders an excuse to return to politics (such as in Burkina Faso[2], Mali[3], Niger[4]). Issues of resilience, ‘third termism’ and other efforts to change constitutions to stay in power despite failing to deliver have acted as triggers to a frustrated youth.[5] This has made some regions in Africa particularly prone to coups. Low growth makes it difficult to build state capacity and to address poverty. Without getting the economics right, support for political and individual rights can crumble, especially among those who have not previously lived under military rule and are less aware of its flaws. The advanced age, extended terms and centralisation of power under some long-serving African leaders mean that – after they pass – we are more likely to see unconstitutional changes of government to establish a chosen successor in power. West Africa is currently the most coup prone region, partly due to a history of coups in some Sahel countries and partly due to a rise in non-state armed actors and extremist groups (especially since the fall of Gaddafi in Libya). There has been a shift in regional dynamics and some realignment.
Since 2001 and the initiation of the Global War on Terrorism, international actors have arguably focused more on security concerns in Africa than on wider democratic issues. This focus on military capability may have encouraged coups. Populist Western leaders have also undermined democratic norms, and others have prioritised bilateral relations with authoritarians over democratic values. China has an attractive development offer and Russia offers itself as a partner of last resort to unpopular leaders. Perceived inconsistencies in the ‘rules based international order’, and growing tensions between the West and Russia have been amplified through social media narratives and have also played a role in this state of flux.
The African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have good written standards but have been unable to fully deliver. Reactions from Western countries to UCGs have been inconsistent too. The region and wider world tend to watch Western responses to UCGs. So greater consistency from external partners could potentially help the AU and RECs to deliver on these norms. If there aren’t efforts to hold countries accountable, then UCGs are likely to continue.
We are at an urgent inflection point. Without action more people – especially restive youth without jobs and who feel the continent is heading in the wrong direction – could become sympathetic to illiberal forces. If this happened it could take decades to get back on the right path. Almost all countries have their own political problems, and partners should be humble in their approach to democracy assistance. It is important to foster democratic systems that moves beyond elite power games, that encompass justice, human dignity and deliver services for the people.
[1] Freedom House (2024), ‘The Mounting Damage of Flawed Elections and Armed Conflict’
[2] ISS (2024), ‘Burkina Faso: progress and problems after two years of transition’
[3] USIP (2021), ‘After Two Coups, Mali Needs Regional Support to Bolster Democracy’
[4] IISS (2023), ‘The coup in Niger’
[5] By 2030, young Africans are expected to make up 42 percent of the world’s youth and account for 75 percent of the those under age 35 in Africa. Population Reference Bureau (2019),