The African Union and Regional Economic Communities have some of the most progressive documents on democratic governance, including the AU Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance[6] (though only 38 members have ratified the latter). They require action against a) coups; b) refusals by governments to relinquish power after elections; and c) amendments or revisions to constitutions that infringe on democratic changes of government. The establishment of these norms helped deliver significant progress on democracy and good governance in the 1990s and the early 2000s: constitutional political order, electoral politics and the importance of human rights were all generally accepted. Between 2000 and 2012, AU and REC UCG instruments were regularly applied, and there were strong international reactions. As a result, coups declined, and democratic pluralism increased.
AU and REC election observation efforts have played an important mediating role behind the scenes. In 2022 Kenya faced a contentious election, but AU and REC observation helped to ensure a peaceful outcome. Sometimes REC institutions can appear more credible than national institutions. In East Africa, for example, some actors look to the EAC Parliament and Court. These regional institutions enable officials to share ideas, experiences and provide a source of energy and resilience. For others, however, they have seemed ineffective and added an additional capacity burden on countries.
While the AU and RECs played a progressive role in establishing norms and helping to entrench democracy, they were not designed to promote democracy and many of their members remain undemocratic. This continues to lead to problems with implementation and enforcement.
Additionally, brinkmanship during recent elections has also created a damaging precedent. Some ruling parties have refused to acknowledge that they have lost, and some opposition parties have threatened to take to the streets if they don’t win. Power sharing compromises were encouraged to end violence (Kenya, Zimbabwe), but may have had the unintended consequence of incentivising further brinksmanship.
So, sometimes AU and REC interventions can work well (for example with ECOWAS on Gambia), but the unequal application of anti-coup measures and failures to respond to incumbent efforts to hold onto power, or to engage with widespread public protests, continue to open the AU and RECs up to attack.
Common challenges
In addition to inconsistency in applying normative frameworks, RECs also often lack resources. At a country level they tend to have small numbers of staff, and some special envoys may not have the necessary skills.
The AU principle of subsidiarity[7] can cause problems if it only acts when RECs are not able to, or if RECs diverge from general AU views. Recent AU reforms of the Peace and Security Council[8] (PSC) have arguably weakened the AU’s ability to address challenges to democracy.
Leadership of the AU and RECs also matters and we should think more about their complexities and interacting relations. Rotating chairs determine the political strength and engagement of AU and REC bodies. Neither are likely to act against a sitting chair. When a relatively ‘weak’ country is chair, we should think more about the significant influence of regional anchor states (Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya). Countries belonging to more than one REC can also complicate things. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) provides another legal and normative basis for external actors (who are also APRM members) to step in. In theory they should give notice when a member state that is unwilling to act on governance challenges, but this does not happen in practice. Most individual countries do not produce the required annual reports, undermining APRM early warning systems.
[6] African Union (2007), African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
[7] Subsidiarity is grounded in the idea that sustainable peace is best achieved when conflict resolution mechanisms are driven by those actors who are most affected by and closest to the conflict. Joint ECCAS-CMI Publication (2016), ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity’
[8] ISS (2024), ‘Will a new Peace and Security Council make a difference?’